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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 950230-CA
Priority No. 2

DALE RYAN McGRATH,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from conviction of two counts of robbery, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1995).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
and
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Were witness statements made nearly six months after an invalidated traffic
stop sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of any illegality?
The trial court's conclusion that the statements were voluntary and attenuated from
any prior illegality is reviewed for correctness; the court's underlying factual findings are

reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271-72
(Utah 1993).
2. Where observation of the pickup's license plate would ultimately have led police
to all the evidence found in the illegal traffic stop, does the "inevitable discovery" doctrine
permit admission of statements made nearly six months later?
See standard of review for issue No. 1.
3. Did defendant's reference to "both the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution" in the trial court preserve defendant's claim that Utah constitutional
analysis should reject federal Fourth Amendment attenuation doctrine in the live witness
context?
"Nominally alluding to such different constitutional guarantees without any analysis
before the trial court does not sufficiently raise the issue to permit consideration by this court
on appeal." State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah App. 1989), reversed on other
grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Resolution of this case does not require interpretation of any constitutional provision,
statute, or rule.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was originally charged with two counts of armed robbery; however, because
Judge Richard H. Moffat suppressed most of the State's evidence, the State dismissed the
case on 11 June 1993 (R. 59).
Based on evidence developed in September 1993, a new information was filed on 30
September 1993 (R. 6-7, 60-61, 113, addendum A). As later amended, the information
charged defendant with two counts of robbery, a second degree felony (R. 6-7). Defendant's
motion to suppress this new evidence was denied by Judge Moffat (R. 56-62, addendum
C).
On 3 February 1995, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to two counts of robbery,
second degree felonies (R. 78-79), reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression
motion (R. 70, 182). Judge Pat B. Brian sentenced defendant to concurrent statutory terms
and a $10,000 fine, but this sentence was stayed and he was placed on 36-month probation
(R. 82). Defendant timely appealed (R. 84).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Crime
On 22 March 1993, defendant assisted David Ricks in robbing a Maverick store in
West Valley and a 7-Eleven store in HoUaday. Defendant drove Ricks to the stores and
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picked him up after each robbery, knowing that he had robbed the stores. This much defendant
has admitted (R. 71).
By agreement between the two, Ricks robbed the stores with defendant's gun and defendant
drove the getaway vehicle, a 1965 white Ford pickup truck (R. 142-43). After the robberies
the two split the proceeds (R. 146).
The Stop
In the early hours of 22 March 1993, Sergeant Jack Dwyer of the Salt Lake County
Sheriffs Office received radio reports about two armed robberies. One was at a West Valley
convenience store at approximately 1:00 a.m., the other at a HoUaday 7-Eleven at approximately
3:15 a.m. (R. 196, 199). The West Valley report included descriptions of two suspects
(R. 198,211).
Sergeant Dwyer interviewed the 7-Eleven clerk, who stated that within a minute after
the robber left he saw an older, full-size model white pickup truck speeding past at a high
rate of speed (R. 199-201, 210, 219).
Sergeant Dwyer began to drive around looking for the suspects (R. 201). Traffic was
"very, very light," even for that time of the morning (R. 202). At about 4:49 a.m., Sergeant
Dwyer saw an older,fiill-sizewhite pickup just west of 39th South and Highland Drive (R.
202, 210). It was traveling approximately 48 miles per hour in a 40-miles-per-hour zone;
also, its tail pipe was dragging, which is an infraction (R. 203-04, 206, 224).
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Although he was concerned with the pickup's speed, he "was more interested in stopping
the vehicle because of the description and the dragging tail pipe" (R. 206). Sergeant Dwyer
testified on direct that he observed the tail pipe infraction "before" he activated his lights
and siren (R. 204) and on cross that he activated his lights and siren and observed the infraction
at "about the same time" (R. 227). He definitely noted the pickup's license plate number
before activating his lights and siren (R. 204-06). Even without the information about the
armed robberies, Sergeant Dwyer "would have stopped the vehicle," perhaps after following
further to get a more definite speed (R. 206-07).
In any event, Sergeant Dwyer stopped the truck and ran a routine warrants check, which
disclosed "numerous warrants on both parties," defendant and Ricks. Sergeant Dwyer
immediately placed them under arrest (R. 214, 230).
Defendant's First Motion to Suppress (Granted)
Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the stop (R. 192).
After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Richard H. Moffat described Sergeant Dwyer's performance
as "good police work" and stated, "I hate like anything to pull the rug out from under it,"
but nevertheless ruled the stop illegal and suppressed all evidence arising out of the stop,
including Ricks' statement made "some 20 [or] 30 hours later" (R. 247-48, see 245-49,
257-58). Judge Moffat reasoned that "there are a lot of older white pickup trucks floating
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around," and "every white pickup truck in the valley certainly shouldn't have been stopped
because of [the victim's] statement" (R. 246).
With the evidentiary heart of its case suppressed, the State dismissed the information
(R. 59, 110).
The State 9s Second Investigation
In September 1993, the State decided to reinvestigate the case as if Sergeant Dwyer
had never stopped defendant's car, but had merely observed it (R. 130).
Sergeant Dwyer gave Detective James Glover the license plate number he had observed
prior to the stop along with a description of defendant's truck (R. 128-29). Detective Glover
ran the license plate number and learned that it was registered to a 1965 Ford pickup owned
by defendant (R. 130). Detective Glover went to defendant's address and left his business
card(R. 131).
Ricks9 testimony. On the same day, 9 September 1993, Glover went to the jail where
Ricks was incarcerated pursuant to the aggravated robberies; Ricks expressed some uncertainty
as to whether he should talk to the detective (R. 135). Glover "had him call his attorney,
and he called him and talked to him" (Id.). Ultimately, Ricks' attorney, Ken Brown, set
up a meeting between Ricks and Glover for the following day (R. 134-35, 140-41).
At the meeting, Ricks explained how both he and defendant were involved in the robberies
and the roles of each (R. 140-46). Specifically, he indicated that the gun they used was
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defendant's, that it was defendant's idea to rob the 7-Eleven, and that defendant drove the
getaway vehicle (R. 142). He also stated that defendant got an equal share of the proceeds
from the robberies (R. 146).
Ricks also disclosed that after defendant's charges were dismissed and he was out of
jail, defendant requested that Ricks call him (R. 147). In the call, defendant begged Ricks
to take the rap for him, saying that he would be indebted to Ricks for life and "would do
anything" for him (R. 148).]
Mrs. McGrath's statement. The morning of 10 September 1993, the day after defendant
talked to Detective Glover, Marjorie McGrath, defendant's mother, called the detective
as he had requested (R. 114-15, 118, 131). She disclosed that on the night of the crimes,
she had observed defendant and Ricks leave her house together at about 11 p.m. They left
in defendant's old white pickup truck (R. 117, 123, 131). Defendant later told her that he
was driving the truck with Ricks that night; however, he claimed that he was driving Ricks
around looking for a place to stay the night (R. 122,125). He also said that Ricks had "some
money" and had given him $10 for gas (R. 122).
Detective Glover asked Mrs. McGrath to have defendant call him (R. 131).

1

Ricks did not take the rap, but ultimately testified to the facts of the robbery at
defendant's preliminary hearing on 18 November 1993 (R. 61, 142). Ricks also pled
guilty to one count of robbery and the other was dismissed (R. 141-42). After a 90day evaluation, Ricks was placed on probation (R. 150-51).
7

Defendant's phone calls to Glover. That same day, 10 September 1993, defendant
called Detective Glover as requested (R. 131, 135). Glover informed defendant that the
State intended to re-file and that defendant should contact his attorney to avoid being booked
again (R. 132). They "talked a little bit about the robberies" and defendant told Glover
"that the only money that he gotfromthe whole situation was $10 or—which he was given,
at Denny's, between the two robberies" (R. 132). He asked Detective Glover to return
the remainder of some money that had been takenfromhim on 22 March 1993 (R. 59, 138).2
Defendant never stated that the $10 was the proceeds of a robbery (R. 59, 136).
Re-filing. Charges against defendant were re-filed 24 September 1993 (R. 6-8, 137).
Defendant's Second Motion to Suppress (Denied)
After the charges were refiled, defendantfileda motion to suppress "any and all evidence
obtained by police as a result of their unlawful and illegal stop of the truck which defendant
was driving on March 22, 1993, at approximately 4:50 a.m." (R. 33-37, addendum B).
Specifically, defendant sought to suppress the September 1993 confession of co-perpetrator
David Ricks, which incriminated defendant; all statements made by defendant to police "at
any time"; and "any other evidence which is a 'fruit of the poisonous tree' stemming from
the illegal stop of defendant's truck" (R. 35-36). Judge Moffat denied the motion and entered
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (R. 56-62, addendum C).
2

The record is unclear on whether this money had been seized from the pickup on
the night of the robberies.
8

Trial Court's Conclusions of Law
Judge Moffat entered the following conclusions of law:
1. Although Sergeant Dwyer's stop of the white pickup on 22 March 1993
was without probable cause or reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal
activity, only that evidence which flows directly from the stop should be suppressed.
The prayer of the defendant in his 23 April 1993 motion was granted fully.
2. Police officers or agencies may continue investigating a crime after the
court suppresses certain evidence of the initial investigation. Evidence arising
from that subsequent investigative effort is not necessarily tainted merely because
police officers are aware of the fruits of their earlier investigation. This is especially
so when the State can show, as it does in this case, that the new evidence is either
unconnected to, or extremely attenuated from the suppressed evidence.
3. After the 11 June 1993 dismissal, the State re-opened the investigation
into this matter. Sometime prior to 24 September 1993, Ricks agreed to testify
about his and defendant's activities on the morning of 22 March 1993, and he
did in fact testify regarding those matters at the preliminary hearing on 18 November
1993. His voluntary testimony in November 2 was purged of any taint associated
with the illegal stop of defendant's truck in March. This purging was effected
by both the passage of time and Ricks' voluntary confession and statements.
4. Statements made by the defendant to police officers after his release from
jail in March of 1993 are not fruit of the poisonous tree. These statements were
initiated by the defendant, were over the telephone, and concerned ownership of
some U.S. currency recovered from the defendant's pockets on the morning of
22 March 1993. Defendant's statement that only $10.00 of the currency was the
proceeds of a robbery was not the result of police questioning.
5. The testimony of Marjorie McGrath regarding her son's activities on the
evening of 21 March 1993 is notfruitof the poisonous tree, since her observations
in this regard were made before, and entirely independent of, the illegal stop several
hours later. Her conversations with her son regarding his involvement in the
robberies is free of any police action and occurred outside and away from the jail.
It is therefore untainted by the illegal stop.
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6. There is no evidence that this Court's 9 June 1993 order, suppressing
evidence obtained as the result of the stop of defendant's truck on the morning
of 22 March 1993, has been or will be violated during the presentation of the State's
evidence in this case.
(R. 60-62, addendum C).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The trial court properly declined to suppress the challenged statements under the
test extrapolatedfromthe controlling case of United States v. Ceccolini. (i) Ricks' statement
was voluntary because it was made nearly six months after the illegal search and after
consultation with his attorney. His status as a co-defendant does not negate this conclusion,
(ii) There is no evidence that money or other evidence seized in the invalidated stop was
used in interrogating him. (iii) The stop was not flagrant, if indeed it was illegal at all, and
its purpose was not to gather evidence in violation of defendant's rights, (iv) The chaUenged
statements were widely separated in time from the illegal stop.
Defendant does not argue that his own statement or that of his mother bore a taint.
Under controlling authorities, they clearly did not.
2. Even if no illegal stop had been made, the police would have ultimately made a
legal stop and discovered all the evidence in defendant's pickup and arrested the perpetrators.
Therefore, the challenged statements are admissible under the "inevitable discovery" doctrine
of Nix v. Williams.
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3. Defendant's vague reference to "both the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution" in the trial court was inadequate to preserve his appellate claim that Utah
constitutional analysis should reject federal Fourth Amendment attenuation doctrine in the
live witness context.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
WITNESS STATEMENTS MADE NEARLY SK MONTHS AFTER
THE TRAFFIC STOP WERE SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED FROM
ANY ILLEGALITY TO BE ADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL
At issue in this case are three statements made on 10 September 1993, five months
and 19 days after the illegal 22 March 1993 traffic stop (R. 71, 113-15, 131-35; Br. of
Aplt. at 8). Defendant focuses primarily on the statement of his co-perpetrator, David
Ricks, but also nominally challenges a statement by his mother, Marjorie McGrath, and
the contents of his own phone conversation. Br. of Aplt. at 8-9. Defendant argues that
these statements were insufficiently attenuated from the invalidated stop as to dissipate
its taint. Id. at 10.3

3

In so doing, defendant does not attack the district court's findings as clearly
erroneous.
11

A. Products of an unlawful search are excluded only if they are tainted
by the illegality.
Exclusionary rule. The United States Supreme Court has long held that
"evidence seized during an unlawful search could not constitute proof against the victim
of the search." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (citing Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)). This exclusion extends to die indirect products of
an unlawful search, id. (citing Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,
391-92 (1920)), the so-called "fruit of die poisonous tree." Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
Dissipation. "As a matter of good sense," however, die connection between die
government misconduct and die evidence "may have become so attenuated as to
dissipate die taint." Id. In such a case, die evidence is not poisoned fruit and should
be admitted. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491.
A defendant's confession or consent to search following a Fourth Amendment
violation is valid "only if bodi of die following tests are met: (i) The consent was given
voluntarily, and (ii) me consent was not obtained by police exploitation of die prior
illegality." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1254, 1262 (Utah 1993).4
4

In determining if diere has been an exploitation of die primary illegality, die
"[fjemporal proximity of die arrest and die confession, [ii] the presence of intervening
circumstances and, particularly, [iii] die purpose and flagrancy of die official
misconduct are all relevant." Brown v. Illinois, All U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975); accord
(continued...)
12

Deterrence. The foregoing analysis is "grounded firmly in the deterrent purposes
of the exclusionary rule." Id. at 1263 {citing Brown v. Illinois, All U.S. 590, 608-12
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). In fact, "Justice Powell's admonition that the
exploitation analysis 'always should be conducted with the deterrent purpose of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule sharply in focus' has become a cornerstone of
search and seizure jurisprudence." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 (citations omitted).
"Drastic" measure. The Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule
"notwithstanding the high social cost of letting persons obviously guilty go unpunished
for their crimes." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 445, 442-43 (1984). "Jurists and scholars
uniformly have recognized that the exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on the
societal interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what concededly is relevant
evidence." United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1976). Exclusion is a
"drastic measure" adopted "in the absence of convincing empirical evidence." Id. at
459. Hence, "application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).

4

(...continued)
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263; State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 691 n.4 (Utah 1990).
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B. The exclusion of live witness testimony requires a closer, more direct
link between the illegality and the testimony.
The Supreme Court has been even more reluctant to apply the exclusionary rule to
the testimony of live witnesses. "Rules which disqualify knowledgeable witnesses from
testifying at trial are . . . 'serious obstructions to the ascertainment of truth';
accordingly, '[f]or a century the course of legal evolution has been in the direction of
sweeping away these obstructions." United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 277
(1978) (quoting C. McCormick, Law of Evidence, § 71 (1954)). Therefore, "the
exclusionary rule should be invoked with much greater reluctance where the claim is
based on a causal relationship between a constitutional violation and the discovery of a
live witness than when a similar claim is advanced to support suppression of an
inanimate object." Id. at 280. Otherwise stated, "a closer, more direct link" is
required before live testimony will be excluded. Id. at 278.
The first of two relevant United States Supreme Court decisions is Brown v.
Illinois. Brown was arrested without probable cause, without a warrant, and under
circumstances indicating that the arrest was investigatory. 422 U.S. at 592-94. After
receiving Miranda warnings, Brown made two inculpatory statements, which were
admitted at trial. Id. at 594-96. "Brown's first statement was separated from his
illegal arrest by less than two hours, and there was no intervening event of significance
whatsoever." Id. at 604. The arrest was obviously illegal and "had a quality of
14

purposefulness"; in fact, the "detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in
the hope that something might turn up." Id. Moreover, the manner of Brown's arrest
u

[gave] the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and

confusion." Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois held "that the Miranda warnings in and
of themselves broke the causal chain so that any subsequent statement, even one
induced by the continuing effects of unconstitutional custody, was admissible so long
as, in the traditional sense, it was voluntary and not coerced in violation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 597.
The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 605. However, it did not hold that the taint
of the illegal arrest had not been purged, merely that the Illinois courts "were in error
in assuming that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, . . . always purge the taint of
an illegal arrest." Id. at 605. The Court remanded for further proceedings. Id. The
narrowness of the Court's holding is significant, because it allows that attenuation
might be demonstrated even under quite egregious facts.
The second relevant Supreme Court decision is United States v. Ceccolini. Officer
Biro, a uniformed police officer, entered Ceccolini's flower shop to talk with a friend,
Lois Hennessey, who was employed there. Id. at 269-70. While at the shop, Officer
Biro noticed an envelope with money sticking out of it lying on the drawer of the cash
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register. Id. at 270. In an act later ruled to be an improper search, Officer Biro picked
up the envelope, examined it, and found betting slips. Id. When Officer Biro asked
Hennessey to whom the envelope belonged, she responded that it belonged to Ceccolini
and that he had asked her to give it to someone. Id. Charges were subsequently filed
against Ceccolini. Id. At his trial some three years later, Hennessey testified as a
witness for the prosecution. Id. Ceccolini claimed that Hennessey's testimony should
have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree because her testimony was a direct
consequence of Officer Biro's illegal search of the envelope (the money and betting
slips were excluded). Id. at 272-73.
The Court noted that it had never adopted a per se rule excluding all evidence
derived from illegal police conduct; it also declined to adopt a contrary per se rule
admitting all live witness testimony regardless of how closely connected to the Fourth
Amendment violation. Id. at 274-76.5
Rather, the Court identified a number of factors relevant to determining whether a
live witness's testimony should be suppressed. These included: (1) the degree of free
will exercised by the witness; (2) whether illegally seized evidence was used in
questioning the witness; (3) the temporal proximity between the illegal conduct, the
witness contact, and the testimony at trial; and (4) the motivation of the police in
5

Chief Justice Burger would have adopted such a per se rule. 435 U.S. at 281
(Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgement).
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conducting the search. Id. at 276, 280-81. See also United States v. Hooten, 662 F.2d
628, 632 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1004 (1982); United States v.
Leonardi, 623 F.2d 746, 752 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980).
Focusing ultimately on deterrence, the Supreme Court held that excluding
Hennessey's testimony "could not have the slightest deterrent effect on the behavior of
an officer such as Biro. The cost of permanently silencing Hennessey is too great for
an evenhanded system of law enforcement to bear in order to secure such a speculative
and very likely negligible deterrent effect." Id. at 280.
C. Exclusion of Ricks' testimony cannot be justified as a deterrent to
future police misconduct.
Under the four Ceccolini factors, the trial court properly ruled admissible the
testimony of David Ricks.
1. Free will* "It is entirely possible, of course, . . . that persons arrested illegally
frequently may decide to confess, as an act of free will unaffected by the initial
illegality." Brown, Ml U.S. at 603. That free will act serves "to break, for Fourth
Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the illegality and the confession."
Id.
Evidence is not u 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have
come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.n Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88.
"Where police misconduct did not induce the witness' cooperation, the testimony will
17

not be suppressed even though the unreasonable intrusion was one step in a series of
events that led to the witness testifying." United States v. Hooten, 662 F.2d 628, 632
(9th Cir. 1981).
Accordingly, that a co-defendant testifies pursuant to a guilty plea or plea bargain
does not render die testimony coerced or tainted. See, e.g., United States v. Leonardi,
623 F.2d 746, 752-53 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding testimony of unindicted co-conspirator,
given pursuant to a plea bargain, was voluntary and untainted by the illegal search that
led to his apprehension); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1043 (5th Cir.
1980) (holding witness's testimony was 'in no way coerced' in the Ceccolini sense,
although it was partially induced by a grant of immunity"); United States v. Stevens,
612 F.2d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding mat co-conspirator's testimony as part
of a plea bargain was volitional and untainted), cert, denied 447 U.S. 921 (1980);
United States v. Hoffman, 385 F.2d 501, 503-05 (7th Cir. 1967) (holding codefendant's guilty plea was sufficiently volitional to dissipate the taint of his illegal
arrest), cert, denied, 390 U.S. 1031 (1968); People v. Steeg, 258 Cal.Rptr. 86, 91 n.2
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (see below); State v. Kent, 391 So.2d 429, 433 (La. 1980)
(holding that testimony of co-defendant who testified under plea agreement was
attenuated from prior illegality); People v. McGrath, 385 N.E.2d 541, 548 (N.Y. 1978)
(witness's decision to testify under grant of immunity dissipates any taint flowing from
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police misconduct which discovered the transactions for which the witness was granted
immunity), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979); People v. Burnie, 624 N.Y.S.2d 463,
464 (A.D. 1995) (memorandum decision) (holding that co-defendant in companion case
"made the independent decision to testify"), appeal denied, 86 N.Y.2d 733 (1995); cf.
United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d 956, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding testimony of
witness whose "decision to testify [was] not a matter of choice, or free will, but made
solely to avoid being jailed for contempt" was a "product of coercion"). Contra State
v. Bravo, 762 P.2d 1318, 1330 (Ariz. 1988) (holding police offer not to press charges
deprived co-perpetrator of "realistic options" and "coerced" his statement), cert,
denied, 490 U.S. 1039 (1989).6
Fear that one's co-defendant will turn state's evidence first, Leonardi, 623 F.2d at
753; a fatalistic view that one will ultimately be brought to account, id.; the pendency
of unrelated charges, id.; a desire to help oneself, Stevens, 612 F.2d at 1229, United
States v. Beesley, 485 F.2d 60, 64 (10th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 941 (1974);
the desire for immunity, Brookins, 614 F.2d at 1043, McGrath, 385 N.E.2d at 544;
and a "desire to change his lifestyle and stay out of trouble," Stevens, 612 F.2d at
1230, have all been cited as non-coerced, untainted, free will motives for a codefendant's testimony.

6

Bravo and Scios are distinguished from the case at bar in footnote 10 of this brief.
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Moreover, at least one court has stated that where "an accomplice on advice of
counsel elects to accept a plea bargain and testify against his former co-defendants, that
testimony is not subject to exclusion if it is later determined that the accomplice was
arrested or detained illegally." Steeg, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 91 n.2. "In other words, the
decision to plead and testify is a sufficiently voluntary act to purge the taint of any prior
illegality." Id.
David Ricks' statement was made upon advice of counsel. When Ricks expressed
uncertainty as to whether he should talk to the Detective Glover, Glover "had him call
his attorney, and he called him and talked to hinT (R. 135). Ricks' attorney then set
up the interview (R. 134-35). Having consulted with counsel, Ricks' statement was
"truly the product of detached reflection and a desire to be cooperative." Ceccolini,
435 U.S. at 277.
Defendant's argument that Ricks "was not a willing citizen witness" leads
nowhere. Even State v. Bravo, 762 P.2d 1318 (Ariz. 1988), upon which defendant
relies, see Br. of Aplt. at 16-17, recognized "that Ceccolini is not limited to cases
involving 'good citizen' witnesses." Id. at 1329.7
Thus, the "free will" factor weighs in favor of attenuation.

7

Bravo is distinguished at footnote 10 herein.
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2. Use of illegally seized evidence in questioning. The second factor which the
Ceccolini Court found relevant to determine attenuation in live-witness cases was the
role the illegally seized evidence played in interviewing the witness. 435 U.S. at 279.
Defendant points the court to no record cites, and the State is unaware of any,
indicating that the police used illegally seized evidence in interviewing Ricks or any
other witness.
Defendant does argue that Ricks' statement was "coerced" because "information
obtained in the illegal traffic stop . . . was used and exploited during subsequent
questioning to obtain Mr. Ricks' assistance . . ." Br. of Aplt. at 18. That is a different
matter. Ceccolini refers to seized physical evidence, not information. See 435 U.S. at
279. See also Hooten, 662 F.2d at 632 (referring to the "role played by the illegallyseized evidence in gaining the witness' cooperation"); Leonardi, 623 F.2d at 752
(observing that witness was confronted with "fruits of the illegal search"); Brookins,
614 F.2d at 1043 (noting that "no illegally seized evidence was used in questioning"
witness).
This factor must weigh in favor of attenuation.
3. Purpose of police misconduct. This is not a case, like Brown v. Illinois,
where the illegality was "obvious,* where the police "embarked upon this expedition
for evidence in the hope that something might turn up," or where the manner of the
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police conduct "gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise,
fright, and confusion." 422 U.S. at 605.8
Defendant states without record citation that the "purpose of Officer Dwyer's stop
of Mr. McGrath's vehicle was to investigate the prior robberies." Br. of Aplt. at 20.
He also describes the stop as "purposeful and flagrant." Id.
On the contrary, the record demonstrates that Sergeant Dwyer's stop of
defendant's truck was anything but flagrant. Judge Moffat himself described it as
"good police work" and stated, "I hate like anything to pull the rug out from under it"
(R. 247).
In fact, the evidence barely supported the ruling. Judge Moffat believed that
Sergeant Dwyer did not see defendant's dragging tail pipe "until after the stop had been
initiated, so it couldn't have been a basis for it" (R. 247). Had Dwyer seen the
infraction first, the judge opined, the stop and arrests would have been legal (id.).9 Yet

8

And even in Brown, the Supreme Court did not hold that the misconduct
necessarily tainted the challenged confession, only that an intervening Miranda warning
did not alone purge the taint. 420 U.S. at 605.
9

The legal assumptions of Judge Moffat's statement are correct. A police officer is
constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the officer observes a traffic violation,
however minor. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1140 (Utah 1994). This is so even if
"a reasonable officer would not have stopped defendant for that reason alone." Id. at
1131, 1140. Accord, Whren v. United States, United States Supreme Court No.
95-5841 (June 10, 1996). Furthermore, "running a warrants check during the course
of a routine traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment, so long as it does not
(continued...)
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Sergeant Dwyer testified on direct that he observed the tail pipe infraction "before" he
activated his lights and siren (R. 204) and on cross that he activated his lights and siren
and observed the infraction at "about the same time" (R. 227).
Officer Dwyer's purpose in stopping defendant's car was laudable. Although he
was concerned with the pickup's speed, he "was more interested in stopping the vehicle
because of the description [of the pickup] and the dragging tail pipe" (R. 206).
Thus, the "purpose" factor weighs in favor of admission.
4, Temporal proximity. Ceccolini makes clear that the greater the time lapse
between the original misconduct, the witness's decision to cooperate, and the actual
time to testify at trial, the greater the likelihood that the testimony is attenuated from
the original misconduct. Ceccolini. 435 U.S. at 279.
Defendant asserts without record citation that Ricks was questioned "shortly after
his arrest." Br. of Aplt. at 19. Ricks was first questioned "the next day" (R. 150),
"some 20 [or] 30 hours later" (R. 248). That statement was suppressed in June 1993.
Ricks made the statement at issue here on 10 September 1993 (R. 133-34), nearly six
months after the invalidated stop. He testified in defendant's preliminary hearing on 18
November 1993, nearly eight months after the illegality (R. 61).

'(...continued)
significantly extend the period of detention beyond that reasonably necessary to request
a driver's license and valid registration and to issue a citation." Lopez, 873 P.2d at
1133.
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The critical point is not when a witness was first questioned, but when he testifies,
since the entire period allows time for the "detached reflection" referred to in
Ceccolini. See United States v. Wyler, 502 F.Supp. 969, 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Defendant's statement was hardly "a spontaneous response to a question put to him in
the frenzy of that event." Brown, All U.S. at 607 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
Thus, the proximity factor also weighs in favor of admission.10
* * *

10

The cases cited by defendant are unpersuasive. United States v. Cruz, 581 F.2d
535 (5th Cir. 1978) {en banc), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Causey,
834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987), is factually distinguishable. Cruz held that the
statements of witnesses who "were initially questioned at the very scene" of an illegal
arrest following a "search having no purpose other than their discovery and
apprehension" were not attenuated from the prior illegality. Id. at 543. Those facts
are dissimilar to the case at bar.
United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1978), involved a witness
whose "decision to testify [was] not a matter of choice, or free will, but made solely to
avoid being jailed for contempt." Id. at 961. Here, no threat of contempt was made.
State v. Bravo, 762 P.2d 1318 (Ariz. 1988) is a legal jumble. To begin with,
the opinion assumes that a Miranda violation taints derivative testimony of third party
witnesses, even if the suspect's statement was wholly voluntary. See id. at 1325-26.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently rejected this view as inconsistent with United
States Supreme Court precedent. See State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah
1995).
Having begun wrong, the Bravo court stayed its course. It found the Miranda
violation to be flagrant as compared to the Fourth Amendment violation in Ceccolini,
although a Miranda violation alone is not serious enough even to poison its fruit.
Bravo also relied on the fact that the unlawful interrogation led directly to a witness
who would not otherwise have been discovered. Id. at 1329. In so doing it unwittingly
adopted the "but for" test the Supreme Court has frequently repudiated. See Wong
Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88; Brown, All U.S. at 599; and Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276.
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The exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose would not be served by suppressing the
testimony of David Ricks. His testimony was voluntarily given after consulting with
counsel six to eight months after the invalidated traffic stop. Moreover, the law has
little interest in deterring "good police work," such as that of Sergeant Dwyer here.
The trial court correctly ruled that Ricks' "voluntary" preliminary hearing testimony in
November 1993 was "purged of any taint associated with the illegal stop of defendant's
truck in March" (R. 61).
E. Under controlling authorities, the trial court properly refused to
exclude the statements of defendant and his mother.
The heading to defendant's point I asserts that the testimony of "the other
witnesses" should also have been suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Br. of
Aplt. at 9. However, the brief never mentions the statements of Marjorie McGrath or
defendant himself in its discussion of attenuation. See Br. of Aplt. at 17-20.
Defendant. Defendant's incriminating statements are a fortiori admissible under
Wong Sun. In Wong Sun, the Supreme Court held, "On the evidence that Wong Sun
had been released on his own recognizance after a lawful arraignment, and had returned
voluntarily several days later to make the statement, we hold that the connection
between the arrest and the statement had 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint.'" 371 U.S. at 490 (citation omitted). Like Wong Sun, defendant initiated the
contact with police while he was not incarcerated (Rs 131, 135). In fact, defendant's
25

act was even more volitional than Wong Sun's, since Wong Sun faced pending charges
and defendant did not (R. 137). Furthermore, defendant's statement was far more
attenuated in time, having been made five and a half months after the invalidated traffic
stop, as compared to Wong Sun's confession made "several days" after his illegal
arrest. 371 U.S. at 491.
The trial court correctly ruled that the statements made by defendant, on his own
initiative, were "not fruit of the poisonous tree" (R. 61).
Mrs. McGrath. The Ceccolini factors weigh overwhelmingly in favor of
admitting Marjorie McGrath's statement. She was subject to no circumstances even
remotely suggesting coercion, no fruits of the stop were used in her questioning, the
purpose of the traffic stop had nothing to do with her, and she was contacted for the
first time nearly six months after the invalidated stop. Also, the pickup's license plate
number, which Sergeant Dwyer noted before activating his lights (R. 204-06), would
have led police to her even if no stop had been made.
The trial court correctly ruled that Mrs. McGrath's statements were "not fruit of
the poisonous tree" and "untainted by the illegal stop" (R. 61).
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POINT TWO
RICKS' TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE INEVITABLE
DISCOVERY DOCTRINE
In the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, the State argued in the alternative
that the testimony at issue should be admitted under the "inevitable discovery" or "ultimate
discovery" doctrine (R. 110, 156-57). At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the
court announced, "there are several bases on which this motion should be denied and it is
denied" (R. 175). However, the district court ruled that the challenged testimony was
sufficiently attenuated from any taint of the illegal stop to be admissible, and hence did not
expressly reach the inevitable discovery issue (R. 60-62,176). Nevertheless, "[i]t is well-setded
that an appellate court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though
the trial court relied on some other ground." Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah
1995); State v. S.V., 906 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 1995); Doe v. V.H., 894 P.2d 1285,
1288 (Utah App. 1995).
On appeal, defendant argues that his co-perpetrator David Ricks' testimony "would
not have been inevitably discovered, and is not admissible on that basis." Br. of Aplt. at
21, see also 21-22. However, defendant does not assert or argue that his own statements
and those of Marjorie McGrath would not have been inevitably discovered or are inadmissible
under that doctrine. Id.
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The inevitable discovery doctrine holds that when "the evidence in question would
inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, there
is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible." Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984). Excluding such evidence would "place courts in the position
of withholding from juries relevant and undoubted truth that would have been available to
police absent any unlawful police activity." Id. at 445.

Such a rule would have little

deterrence value and would be "formalistic, pointless, and punitive." Id. at 444-45. It is
the government's burden to "establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information
ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means." Id. at 444. This
Court has recognized the inevitable discovery doctrine. See State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d
916, 923 n.8 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1293 (Utah App. 1988).
The doctrine applies here. Legally obtained evidence would have led police to Ricks.
Without any misconduct, Sergeant Dwyer's suspicions would have caused him to follow
defendant's truck, note its license plate number, and request a warrants check. This request
would have been entirely legal.11 Discovering "numerous warrants" on defendant, its registered
owner, Dwyer would have stopped the truck and ultimately discovered Ricks and the
11

If "running a warrants check during the course of a routine traffic stop does not
violate the Fourth Amendment, so long as it does not significantly extend the period of
detention beyond that reasonably necessary to request a driver's license and valid
registration and to issue a citation," State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994),
running a warrants check without stopping the vehicle is a fortiori permissible under
the Fourth Amendment.
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incriminating physical evidence. The balance of the story would have played out exactly
as it has, except that no evidence would ever have been suppressed. Ricks would have had
all the same motives to testify.
Even if no stop had ever occurred, the truck's license plate number would have led
police to defendant, and thence to his mother, whose statement would have implicated Ricks.
His "numerous warrants" would have landed Ricks in jail, where police would have questioned
him about the aggravated robberies. Ricks might or might not have been motivated by the
plea bargain in connection with these robberies, but he would still have been motivated by
* some or all of the following: fear that defendant would turn state's evidence first, the pendency
of "numerous" unrelated charges, a desire to help himself, and a desire to change his lifestyle.
See Point I.D.I, herein.
As the Seventh Circuit observed in a related context, "[I]t would be naive to assume
that but for the unlawful arrests the [of witnesses] would 'have blended back into the mass
of the population, and would have remained at large' as appellant's contend." United States
v. Hoffman, 385 F.2d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 1967) (citation omitted).
Obviously, any scenario excluding the invalidated stop would have led police to defendant
and his mother. Defendant does not contend otherwise. Accordingly, their statements,
as well as Ricks' testimony, were admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
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POINT THREE
DEFENDANT'S NOMINAL REFERENCE TO THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS APPELLATE CLAIM
THAT UTAH SHOULD REJECT FEDERAL ATTENUATION
DOCTRINE IN THE LIVE WITNESS CONTEXT
Defendant argues that this Court should construe the Utah State Constitution to repudiate
the attenuation analysis set forth in United States v. Ceccolini. Br. of Aplt. at 22-24. However,
defendant waived this claim by failing to advance it in the district court.
Defendant's written motion to suppress never mentions the state constitution or any
cases interpreting it (see R. 33-37). Nevertheless, defendant claims to have preserved the
issue with the following oral statement in the trial court:
Your Honor, for the record, and I know that you're aware of this, but just
so the record reflects it, we make this motion to suppress under both the United
States Constitution and the Utah Constitution, and as the Court is aware, from
cases such as State vs. Ramirez and State v. Larocco. our Supreme Court has made
it clear that the Federal Constitution and Utah Constitution need not necessarily
be interpreted in the same way
THE COURT: I underMS. REMAL: —and sometimes they're not.
(R. 163), Br. of Aplt. at 3. This statement falls far short of preserving the issue.
"A defendant cannot preserve issues for appeal by generally objecting or nominally
invoking the state and federal constitutions.n State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 460 (Utah
1994). "Nominally alluding to such different constitutional guarantees without any analysis
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before the trial court does not sufficiently raise the issue to permit consideration by this court
on appeal." State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah App. 1989), reversed on other
grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). Yet defendant did nothing more. His reference to
"both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution" could not have initiated
the "thoughtful or probing analysis" that this Court has held must begin at the trial level.
State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990). The issue is waived.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT and PUBLISHED OPINION
The State requests oral argument on the ground that it would significantly aid the decisional
process in this case. A published opinion would contribute substantially to the body of Utah
case law.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ( [June 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
JAMES M. COPE, Bar No. 0726
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by:
Assigned to:

J. COPE
J. COPE

Plaintiff,
O R M A T I O N

-vsDALE RYAN MCGRATH,
DOB 10/5/72
OTN
Defendant.

Case Nb.
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The undersigned Sgt. L. Marx - Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office, under oath states on information and belief that the
defendant, committed the crimes of:
COUOT I
.AGGra^^TED ROBBERY, a rjf^t Degree Felony, at 6398 South Highland
Drive, in Salt Lalce County, State of Utah, on or about March
22, 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
DALE RYAN MCGRATH, a party to the offense, unlawfully and
intentionally took personal property in the possession of 7Eleven from the person or immediate presence of Jamey
Jensen, and in the course of committing said robbery use£-oiSv
threatened the use of a dangerous weapon, to-wit:
a/gurw}
further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or ttie
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or
furtherance of the Aggravated Robbery, giving rise to
enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-202, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended.

C00C6

INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH V. DALE RYAN MCGRATH
County Attorney No. 93 1 90105
Page 2

COUNT yi
j$\y~^
AGGRj^ATED ROBBERY, a<Fi*st Degree Felony, at 5390 South 5600
/West, in Salt Lake bounty, State of Utah, on or about March
22, 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
DALE RYAN MCGRATH, a party to the offense, unlawfully and
intentionally took personal property in the possession of
Maverick Country Store from the person or immediate presence
of Richard Andrus, and in the course of committing said
robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous weapon,
to-wit: a gun; further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm or the representation of a firearm was used in the
commission or furtherance of the Aggravated Robbery, giving
rise to enhanced penalties as provied by S76-3-202, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Jamey Jensen, Dep. Mark Coleman, Sgt. Jack Dwyer, Det. James
Glover, Richard Andrus and David Ricks.

PROBABLE-CAUSE ^STATEMENT:
Richard Andrus, a Maverickj£outtfcry~ Store Clerk, told police
that a masked man armed with 4£ hand<ju»-HT£ci robbed his store of
about $130.00 at about 0103 on March 22, 1993.
The store is
located at 5390 South 5600 West.
—
*~
Jamey Jensen, a 7-Eleven store clerk, told police that he
had been robbed of cash from the store• s register at about 0315
on February 22, 1993.-- Seconds after the handgun-armed male left
the store, the clerk saw a white pick-up truck go north on
Highland Drive. The 7-Eleven is located at 6398 South Highland
Drive in Holladay.
On March 22, 1993r at approximately 4:50 a.m., Sergeant Jack
Dwyer of the Salt Lake County Sheriff1 s Office saw two young men
driving south in a white 1985 Ford Pick-up on Highland Drive at
about 3900 South. The License number of their pick-up was 587
FUH. Aware that an older model white pick-up had been seen on
Highland Drive at the time and place of an armed robbery that
same morning, Dwyer notified your affiant about the pick-up.

00097
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INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH V. DALE RYAN MCGRATH
County Attorney No. 93 1 90105
Page 3
After determining that this white pick-up was registered to
a Dale R. McGrath, your affiant telephoned the McGrath residence
on September 9, 1993 and spoke to Marjorie McGrath. She informed
that Dale was her son, that he did own a white Ford pick-up in
March of 1993, and that Dale was with a David Ricks on the
evening of March 21# 1993. She said the boys had left together
that evening to find a new place for Ricks to reside.
Your affiant contacted David Ricks, who advised that he and
McGrath had used McGrath1s car and handgun to rob two convenience
stores in Salt Lake County during the early morning hours of
March 22, 1993. He said that he did the actual robberies while
McGrath did the driving. He said these stores were located near
5600 West 5100 South and Highland Drive in the Holladay area.
One was a Maverick and one was a 7-Eleven.
He further stated
that McGrath had asked him (Ricks) to Mtake the rap for him"
(McGrath) regarding these two robberies and that McGrath would
make it up to Ricks when Ricks got out of jail or prison. This
telephone conversation took place in late April or early May
while Ricks was in the Salt Lake County Jail.
On September 10, 1993 McGrath called your affiant to state
that he did not wish to be re-booked on this charge and that the
only money he received from Ricks was about ten dollars that he
received at a Denny's restaurant where they ate the morning of
the robberies.

Affiant
Subscribed^ and sworn to before
me this
2^6 day of September,
1993.

^GISTRATE
Authorized for presentment and\£jAing:

Q&j-tJ
JUDITH S. H. ATHEF.T0H

DAVID E. YOCOM, County Attorney

%L

jputy County Attorney
September 24, 1993
msy/93 1 90105

C000B
* e^O0WING CONFIO

LOOUfttVJAI* '

ADDENDUM B

SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone:
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/

532-5444
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICI

u—

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

:

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

:
:

DALE MC GRATH,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 931901789FS
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

:

COMES NOW the defendant above-named, by and through his
attorney of record, LISA J. REMAL, and hereby moves this court as
follows:
To suppress any and all evidence obtained by police as a
result of their unlawful and illegal stop of the truck which the
defendant was driving on March 22, 1993, at approximately 4:50
a.m.; said stop was effected by Sgt. Dwyer of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office. The basis of the defendant's Motion to Suppress
is that said stop of the truck was without either probable cause or
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. A robbery
had occurred approximately one hour and thirty minutes earlier at
a location approximately twenty blocks away from the location where
the truck was stopped. After that robbery had occurred, the victim
of that robbery told police that he had seen a white, full-sized
pick-up truck drive by the store where the robbery occurred
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approximately sixty to ninety seconds after the robber had left tha
store; neither the victim nor any other person saw the robber get
into any vehicle, saw any vehicle at all during the robbery, or
heard a vehicle start up after the robber left the store. When the
victim saw a white pick-up truck drive by sixty to ninety seconds
later, he could not see into the truck.

He could not, therefore,

see who was in the truck, or even determine how many people were in
the truck.

These facts do not constitute either probable cause or

reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity and, thus,
the stopping of the defendant in his truck violated his right
against unlawful search and seizure as guaranteed him by the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and also by Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968) ; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) ; State v. Carpena,
714 P.2d 674 (Utah, 1986); State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah,
1985) .
Further,

if

the police

officer

says

he

stopped

the

defendant's vehicle for a traffic violation, the defendant contends
such a stop was a pretext stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and also Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution.

State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App.

1988) .
If the stop of the defendant's vehicle was not a pretext
stop, then the scope of the detention exceeded the purpose of the
stop.

State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d

761

(Utah, 1991);

State v.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah, 1991) ; State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431
(Utah App. 1990) .

C0034

The defendant did not consent to the search and, if he
did consent, the consent was not knowingly and voluntarily made,
and the consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal
stop to purge it of the illegality of the stop.
979 P.2d 431

State v. Robinson.

(Utah App. 1990).

The defendant respectfully prays for the suppression of
any and all inculpatory evidence seized by the police as a result
of this illegal stop including but not limited to: money, weapons
and the testimony of State witness David Ricks.

The defendant

submits that Ricks' testimony is clearly "fruit of the poisonous
tree" in that he was a passenger in defendant's truck when it was
stopped by Sgt. Dwyer on March 22, 1993; the discovery of Ricks as
a potential State's witness, therefore, is a direct result of the
unlawful stop of defendant's vehicle by Sgt. Dwyer and there is no
attenuation which would purge the taint of this unlawful stop. See
Wong Sun v. U.S. , 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
The defendant, further, seeks to suppress any statements
made by the defendant to Sgt. Dwyer at any time as being "fruits of
the poisonous tree", and not sufficiently attenuated to purge the
taint of the unlawful stop.

If it were not for the unlawful stop

of the defendant's truck by Sgt. Dwyer, the defendant's identity
would never have been known; no conversations, therefore, could
have ever taken place between the defendant and Sgt. Dwyer as Sgt.
Dwyer would not have known the identity of any of the participants
in the robberies.

See Wong Sun v. U.S., supra.

The defendant submits that the issue of whether the
defendant's truck was illegally stopped and the money and weapons
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should be s u p p r e s s e d

has already been

fully

litigated

and

ordered

suppressed by this Court by its decision on June 9, 1993 when the
defendant's Motion to Suppress was granted and the State then moved
to dismiss the case against the defendant.
are

bound

decision.

by

the

doctrine

of

The parties and Court

Res Judicata

to

abide by

that

As the case has now been refiled, the defendant submits

this Court is limited to deciding only whether or not the codefendant's testimony and statements by the defendant subsequent to
the dismissal of the case on June 9, 1993 must also be suppressed.
Finally, the defendant prays for suppression of any other
evidence which is a "fruit of the poisonous tree" stemming from the
illegal stop of the defendant's truck by Sgt. Dwyer on March 22,
1993.
DATED this

I'

day of January, 1994.

LISA J. RBMAL
Attorney~for Defendant
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NOTICE OF H E A R T S

TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:

You and each of you please take notice that the aboveentitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on Tuesday, the
15th day of March, 1994, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. before the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat. Please govern yourselves accordingly.
DATED this

*'

day of January, 1994.

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this

day of January, 1994.

JAN 11 V3M
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ADDENDUM C

LISA J. REMAL (2722)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone: 532-5444
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff
v.

Case No. 931901789FS
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

DALE MCGRATH
Defendant
The defendant's Motion

to Suppress Evidence

came

on

regularly for hearing on the 15th day of March 1994. The Court has
read the defendant's written motion filed 11 January 1994, listened
to the testimony of Detective James Glover, Marjorie McGrath and
David Ricks, and considered the arguments of counsel regarding this
motion.

The Court also recalled and noted evidence from a similar

motion pertaining to Case No. 931900519FS, which motion was heard
by this Court on 9 June 1993.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court

enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. During the early morning hours of 22 March, 1993, two
different convenience stores were robbed about 2 hours apart by a
lone gunman, who escaped from both the stores on foot.

The clerk-

victim at the second of the two stores saw a full-size, older model
white pickup drive by the store about sixty to ninety seconds after
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the robber left, and gave this information to responding police
officers a few minutes later. No suspects or evidence relating to
the robberies were discovered directly outside either store that
night.
2.

About one hour and thirty-five minutes after the

second robbery, Sergeant Jack Dwyer saw a white 1985 Ford pickup
going south on Highland Drive at about 3900 South. Because he had
heard about a white older model pickup being connected with the 2
robberies, Dwyer followed the pickup, noted that two white males
were in the cab, and that the license plate was 587FUH.
3.

Dwyer then stopped the truck and discovered or

elicited certain incriminating evidence or statements, all of which
were ordered suppressed on 9 June 1993.
4.

Dwyer discovered the identities of Dale McGrath and

David Ricks after he stopped the truck.
5.

Dwyer gave the truck

Detective James Glover.
registered

license plate number to

Glover determined that this truck was

to Dale McGrath.

He contacted McGrath's mother,

Marjorie, at the address given on the truck registration, and gave
her a subpoena to testify at the hearing on 15 March 1994..
6.

Marjorie McGrath testified at the hearing that her

son Dale had left the residence with David Ricks on the night of 21
March 1993 in her son's white 1985 Ford pickup.

She said that

sometime after 22 March 1993, her son had told her that he was
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with Ricks and was driving the truck on the night of the robberies;
The defendant told Mrs. McGrath, as he was leaving, that he was
driving Ricks around trying to find him a place to stay that night.
7.

David Ricks testified

that he had robbed two

convenience stores in Salt Lake County during the early morning
hours of 22 March 1993.
8.

Ricks said that he used a disguise, and a gun

provided by McGrath, to perform the robberies, while McGrath drove
the getaway truck.

Ricks claimed that McGrath shared in the

robberies' proceeds and that McGrath proposed the second robbery
after they mutually determined that the first one had not netted
enough.
9.

Ricks further testified that in late April or early

May of 1993, McGrath called him at the Salt Lake County Jail asking
that Ricks take responsibility for the two robberies and promising
that McGrath would make it up to him; that McGrath could get an
apartment with Ricks when Ricks got out of jail.
10.

Ricks also testified that he was continuously in

custody between his arrest on 22 March 1993, and his sentencing
date on 11 November 1993. While in custody, Ricks was interviewed
by

police

officeres

both

on

23

March

1993

and

again

in

approximately September, 1993. During the 23 March 1993 interview,
Ricks confessed to the robberies and implicated McGrath as a
knowing party to the robberies.

The September interview was
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the result of a visit to the jail by Detective Glover, who was
advised by Ricks' attorney that Ricks would make a statement and
testify against McGrath. During that interview, Ricks agreed once
again to testify against McGrath.

Ricks hoped that his co-

operation and his testimony against McGrath would influence the
Court to sentence him to probation.

He was, in fact, placed on

probation.
11.

On 10 September 1993, Detective Glover received a

telephone call from the defendant, Dale McGrath.

During this

telephone call, McGrath said that he had received only $10.00 from
Ricks on the morning of the robberies and that he therefore wanted
the remainder of the money taken from him on 22 March 1993 returned
to him. McGrath never stated to Det. Glover that the money was the
proceeds of a robbery.
12. The stop of the pickup truck by Sergeant Dwyer on 22
March 1993 (paragraph 3 supra) was ruled by this Court to have been
made without an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the truck
had some connection with a crime of which Dwyer was aware. All the
money and weapons recovered from the defendant as a result of this
stop, as well as any statements made by the defendant to police
officers after his arrest and until his release from jail, were
suppressed.
13.

After this Court suppressed the evidence noted

above, the case against the defendant was dismissed on 11 June
1993.

It was refiled on 24 September 1993.
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14. David Ricks, the co-defendant in the original case,
plead guilty on 22 April 1993 to Count I as charged (Aggravated
Robbery, a first degree felony) and Count II was dismissed.

He

testified at the preliminary hearing of the refiled charges on 18
November 1993.
Based upon the findings listed above, the Court makes the
following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Although Sergeant Dwyer's stop of the white pickup on
22 March

1993 was without probable

cause or reasonable and

articulable suspicion of criminal activity, only that evidence
which flows directly from the stop should be suppressed.

The

prayer of the defendant in his 23 April 1993 motion was granted
fully.
2.

Police

officers

or

agencies

may

continue

investigating a crime after a court suppresses certain evidence of
the initial investigation.

Evidence arising from that subsequent

investigative effort is not necessarily tainted merely because
police

officers

investigation.

are

aware

of

the

fruits

of

their

earlier

This is especially so when the State can show, as

it does in this case, that the new evidence is either unconnected
to, or extremely attenuated from the suppressed evidence.
3. After the 11 June 1993 dismissal, the State re-opened
the investigation into this matter. Sometime prior to 24 September
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1993, Ricks agreed to testify about his and defendant's
activities on the morning of 22 March 1993, and he did in fact
testify regarding those matters at the preliminary hearing on 18
November 1993. His voluntary testimony in November was purged of
any taint associated with the illegal stop of defendant's truck in
March.

This purging was effected by both the passage of time and

Ricks' voluntary confession and statements.
4.

Statements made by the defendant to police officers

after his release from jail in March of 1993 are not fruit of the
poisonous tree. These statements were initiated by the defendant,
were over the telephone, and concerned ownership of some U.S.
currency recovered from the defendant's pockets on the morning of
22 March 1993.

Defendant's statement that only $10.00 of the

currency was the proceeds of a robbery was not the result of police
questioning.
5. The testimony of Marjorie McGrath regarding her son's
activities on the evening of 21 March 1993 is not fruit of the
poisonous tree, since her observations in this regard were made
before, and entirely independent of, the illegal stop several hours
later. Her conversations with her son regarding his involvement in
the robberies is free of any police action and occurred outside and
away from the jail. It is therefore untainted by the illegal stop.
6.

There is no evidence that this Court's 9 June 1993

order, suppressing evidence obtained as the result of the stop of
defendant's truck on the morning of 22 March 1993, has been or will
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be violated during the presentation of the State's evidence in this
case.
Based upon these facts and conclusions, the defendant's
11 January 1994 Motion to Suppress shall be, and hereby is denied.

Dated this

<5.

day of June, 1994.
BY THE COURT

Approved as to form:

/y James Cope

V

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this

day of June, 1994
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